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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
.JOHN B. GARSIDE and 
BETTY B. GARSIDE, 
Plaintiffs an.d Respondents, 
-vs-
DE LOYD HILLSTEAD, 
Defendant and Apprlla11t. 
Case No. 
10364 
APPELLANT'S BRIEF 
NATFRE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from an order denying defendant's 
motion to set aside a def a ult judgment obtained against 
him on tlw basis of service of process under the provi-
sionl' of the l'tah Non-Resident Motorist Statute, when 
defendant did not receive copies of the Summons and 
Complaint nor have notice that any law suit had been 
initiated against him until after the matter had gone 
to judgint>nt by default. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
On ~ ovt>mber 10, 19(14, the Lower Court granted 
a d('lfault judgment in favor of plaintiff J olm B. Gar-
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side and against defendant for the sum of $7,3:30.87 and 
in favor of plaintiff, Betty B. Garside, and against 
defendant for the sum of $11,072.38. Upon learning of 
the default judgment defendant filed his answer to plain-
tiffs' complaint and at the same time made a motion 
to have the judgment set aside and the matter litigated 
upon its merits. Defendant's motion ·was denied. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Defendant seeks an order vacating the default judg-
ment and order rewarding the case to the District Court 
for trial on its merits. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On August 12, 1961, defendant De Loyd Hi11stead 
was the driver of an automobile that was involved in 
an accident on U. S. Highway 189, in Hoytsville, Summit 
County, Utah, with an automobile driven by .John B. 
Garside and in which Betty B. Garside was a passenger. 
At that time defendant was a resident of the State of 
California residing at 9612 Alowood, Garden Grove, 
California. 
Three years later on September 8, 196-±, plaintiffs 
filed a complaint in the District Court of Salt Lake 
County seeking judgment against defendant for property 
damage and personal injury resulting from the auto-
mobile accident (R-1). With their complaint, plaintiffs 
filed an affidavit alleging that a copy of ther summons 
and complaint was mailed to defendant at 9612 Alwood, 
Garden Grove, California (R. 4-5). Copies of the Sum-
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wons and complaint w<·n~ also sPrved upon the f.ipcretary 
of Stat<' of tlw Statt> of l'tah (R. GO). 
Tlw copies of th<> summons and complaint which 
plaintiffs mail<·d to dL•f Pndant WL·n• nt>ver received by 
hilll and <·ons<'quently lw had no notice that an action 
Juul !wen intiab:•d against him nor did lw have an oppor-
tunity to d<>frnd in said action (R. 18). 
(In ~owmlwr 10, 19G-1-, the District Court of Salt 
Lah County, ~larcl'llus K. Snow, Judge, granted judg-
111,.nt in favor of plaintiffs and against defendant for 
th<' au:gn·gatl' sum of $18,4o:3.:25 (R. 7,8). No notice of 
tli<· granting or entry of the judgment was ever mailed 
tn dt>fen<lant. ( SPP reeorcr). It was not until January 1, 
1%5, that plaintiffs' attornPy sent a letter to defendant 
at 1:2:201 i><'a('ock Avemw, Apartnwnt #2, Garden Grove, 
California, advising him that judgment had been taken 
against him. This lPttL·r was rect>ived by defendant who 
imm<'<liatt>l~· thereafter contacted his insurance carrier 
of tlH· filing of thr lawsuit and tht> resulting $18,403.25 
dt>fanlt judgrnt>nt. 
l-pon n•cPiving the information the insurance carrier 
C(Jntad<·d counsl'l in Utah requesting that action be 
tahn to havp the default judgment vacated and the 
matter disvos<>d of upon its mPrits. Accordingly, on 
Ft>bruary 25, 19()3, an answPr to plaintiffs' complaint 
on a motion to sl't aside tht> default judgment was filt>d 
stating that ckfrndant had no knowledge of the legal 
aetion !weans<· lw had nPvt>r rt>ceivf>d notice of its initia-
tion ( R. lS). Tlw motion was argtwd beforp the Honor-
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able Marcellus K. Snow, on the basis and with the 
understanding of the facts set forth herein. After being 
"fully advised in the premises," Judge Snow denied 
defendant's motion to vacate the judgment against him. 
(R. 20) 
It is from the denial of defendant's motion to set 
aside plaintiffs' judgment against him that this appeal 
is taken. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION 
AND WAS IN ERROR AS A MATTER OF 
LAW IN NOT SETTING THE DEFAULT 
JUDGMENT ASIDE. 
Rule 56 (c) Utah Rules of Civil Procedure declares: 
For good cause shown the court may set 
aside an entry of default and, if a judgment by 
default has been entered, may likewise set it 
aside in accordance with Rule 60 (b). 
The pertinent provisions of Rule 60 (b) are as 
follows: 
On motion and upon such terms as are just 
the court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
a party or his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons : ( 1) mistake, inadvertance, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; . . . ( 7) any other reason justi-
fying relief from the operation of the judgment. 
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The rnle thPn goes on to say: 
The motion shall be made with a reasonable 
time and for reasons (1), (2), (3) or (4) not 
more than 3 months after the judgment, order or 
proceeding was entered or taken. 
It should he noted that no time limitation is prescribed 
for relief sought under rPason number (7) of the rule. 
Tht.· Rules of Civil Procedure referred to are codifi-
cation of the attitude and policy of this State relative 
to the setting aside of default judgments with the pur-
po:-;P of setting up guide lives for tlw trial Court in the 
exercise of the sound discretion in such matters. One 
of the reasons for the adoption of the Rules was to re-
move many of the technical difficulties envoked in plead-
mg and to avoid the inequities resulting from a failure 
of a party or his legal representative to properly adhere 
to the rather sturgent rules of code pleading by which 
man~· eases were won and lost. 
As a gt>neral rule, the courts incline toward granting 
reliPf from defaults and default judgments and will at-
tt>mpt to grant judgment upon the merits of a claim 
unless the default is the result of inexcusable neglect of 
the party in default or where it would be inequitable to 
set it aside. Cutler 'CS. Haycock, 32 F. 354, 90 P. 897. 
Tn the case of Byland i·s. Crooke et al, m 208 P. 504, 
the Ftah Supreme Court stated on page 505: 
Our trial courts are usually very liberal in 
vacating and setting aside default judgments en-
tered against a defaulting party by a reason of a 
mistake, inadventure, or excusable neglect, or in 
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cases where there has been fraud or deceit prac-
ticed. Under our practice it is generally regarded 
as an abitse of discretion for the trial court not to 
vacate and set aside a default judgment when 
there is any reasonable grounds for doing so, and 
timely application is made. (Emphasis added) 
It is recognized that the moving party should be 
diligent and show that he was prevented from avoiding 
the default judgment because of circumstances over 
which he had no control. This concept is stated in War-
ren vs. Dixon Ranch Company et al., 260 P. 2d 7-11, at 
page 743: 
Discretion mus tbe exercised in furtherance 
of justice and the court will incline toward grant-
ing relief in a doubtful case to the end that a 
party may have a hearing: Hurd vs. Ford, 74 Utah 
46, 276 Pac. 908. However, the movant must show 
tha the has used due diligence and that he was 
prevented from appearing by circumstances over 
which he had no control. Peterson vs. Crozier, 29 
Utah 235, 81 Pac. 860. 
The case of Cutler vs. Haycock, supra, involves a dif-
ferent kind of lawsuit than the instant case but the 
statments therein by our Superem Court are of assist-
ance in the consideration of default matters generally. 
At page 900 of the Pacific Reporter the Court said: 
As has been well said in all doubtful cases 
the general rule of courts is to incline towards 
granting relief from the default and to bring 
about judgment on the merits. 
Continuing the Court went on to say: 
This rule, as appears from the authorities, is 
of almost universal application, and is defeated 
only in cases where the default is the result of 
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inexcusable neglect of the party in default, or 
where it would be inequitable to set it aside. 
(Emphasis added) 
The Court went to state that the trial court had abused 
its discretion in not setting aside the default because 
of tlw following reasons: 
1. Defendant had made reasonable efforts to com-
ply with the law. 
•) The case arose in a sparsely settled country 
when communications were slow. 
:3. Good faith and reasonable effort to make a 
defense are always elements to be considered 
in each case. 
4. There was no indication that plaintiff would 
have suffered either inconvenience or loss of 
any kind by setting aside the default. 
5. Plaintiff had not gone to great expense and 
sacrifice of time to prepare for trial which 
effort and expense would have to be duplicated 
if the other party was permitted to def end. 
In considering what has been said thus far and 
comparing other cases and the applicable rules to the 
instant case the inequities are f orceably brought to appel-
lant's attention. In the year 1961 while a resident of 
California, as the driver of an automobile, was involved 
in an accident in Utah. At that time he gave plaintiffs 
his address in California. In 1964, plaintiffs filed suit 
in l'tah against defendant and mailed copies of the 
summons and complant to him at the place of his resi-
dence in 1964. Defendant never received the copies of 
the summons and complaint which plaintiffs mailed to 
him. Naturally, because he had no notice of the suit, 
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no pleadings were filed on defendant's behalf nor was 
any appearance made by him or on his behalf. Again, 
naturally judgment by default was taken against him. 
Interestingly enough no notice of any kind relative to 
the judgment was made to def end until some 60 dan 
after it was taken and this was in the form of a letter 
mailed to a different address than the summons and 
complaint were mailed to. This letter advised defendant 
that plaintiffs were judgment creditors of his in tlw 
total aggregate sum of $18,403.25. Upon receiving this 
intelligence defendant responded immediately by con-
tacting his insurance carrier of the policy under which 
he has an omnibus insured. Every reasonable effort was 
taken thereafter for defendant to def end himself against 
plaintiffs' claims. 
Certainly the equities in this case are on the side 
of def end.ant. To be considered are the following items: 
a. The lapse of 3 years from the time of the 
accident to the commencement of the lawsuit 
against defendant. 
b. The mailing of copies of a summons and 
complaint to defendant at an address plaintiff~ 
knew was three years old. 
c. The withholding of notice to defendant of 
judgment against him until two month time had 
elapsed. 
d. The sending of a letter to defendant at a 
completely different address than where the sum-
mons and complaint were mailed advising def end-
ant of the judgment. 
e. The distance of approximately one thom;-
and miles between defendants residence and the 
place where the lawsuit was commenced. 
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f. The fact that defendant had not actual 
notice of the suit until judgment had been taken 
against him. 
g. The filing of the motion to have the default 
set aside and the filing of an answer in an effort 
to protect defendant against the claims of plain-
tiffs and to have this matter disposed of on the 
merits. 
b. The fact that plaintiffs' knew defendant 
had not responded to their summons and com-
plaint and consequently they and their attorney 
did not sacrifice a great time and expense to 
obtain their judgment which would have to be 
duplicated if defendant is allowed to defend in this 
action. 
i. The fact that although several months time 
elapsed before defendant took action in an attempt 
to protect himself from the judgment by default, 
defendant did act quickly and reasonably after 
becoming aware of his position. 
It is appellant's position that these facts coupled 
with the law of this State and the attitude of he Courts 
relative to default matters establishes that the District 
Court in the instant case abused its discretion in not 
setting aside the default judgment against defendant 
and in not permitting him to defend against plaintiffs' 
claims. 
In Ney vs. Harrison, 5 U. 2d 217, 299 P. 2d 1114, the 
Court asserted: 
The statutory authority of trial courts to set 
aside judgments obtained by default has been 
literally 'construed to the end that there be tried 
on the merits, beginning with our earliest deci-
sions. In the recent case of Warren vs. Dixon 
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Ranch Co., we had occasion to review the policv 
considerations and reaffirmed the attitude of lib-
eral construction, thus: 
"The allowance of a vacation of judg-
ment is a creature of equity designed tu 
relieve a.gainst harshness of enforcing a judg-
ment, which may occur through procedural 
difficulties, the wrongs of the opposing party, 
or misfortunes which prevent the presenta-
tion of a claim or defense!'' (Emphasis add-
ed) 
And in Mayhe~ vs. Standard Gilsonite Company, 
14 U. 2d 52, 376 P. 2d 951, it was held that it is an abuse 
of discretion to refuse to vacate a default judgment where 
there is reasonable justification or excuse for the de-
fendant's failure to appear and timely application is 
made to set aside. 
1Let it be understood that the conduct of plaintiffs 
and their counsel in delaying two months before sending 
defendant a letter advising of the default judgment when 
they knew defendant was not aware that a suit had been 
filed against him was the cause of the time lapse between 
the granting of the judgment and defendant's motion to 
have it set aside. However, upon receipt of information 
of what had occurred defendant application to set the 
default judgment was timely. Because of the equities 
of the case and because the allowance of a vacation of 
a default judgment is a creature of equity as stated in 
Ney vs. Harrison, supra, the trial court abused its dis-
cretion as per the court's declaration in Mayhem vs. 
Standard Gilsonite Company, supra. 
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In order to fully appreciate defendant's position in 
this matter it is felt that the certain aspects of the 
Utah Non-Resident Motorist Statute should be discussed. 
The pertinent provisions of Title 41, Section 12, 
Paragraph 8, Utah Code Annotated, 1953, are as follows: 
The use and operation by a nonresident or 
his agent of a motor vehicle upon and over the 
highways of the State of Utah shall be deemed 
an appointment by such nonresident of the Sec-
retary of State of the State of Utah to be his 
true and lawful attorney upon whom may be 
served all legal processes in any action or pro-
ceeding against him growing out of such use or 
operation of a motor vehicle. . . . Service of such 
process shall be made by serving a copy thereof 
upon the Secretary of State - and such service 
shall be sufficient service upon the said nonresi-
dent provided, that notice of such service and a 
copy of the process be within ten days thereafter 
sent by mail by the plaintiff to the defendant at 
his last known address. 
The Record indicates that plaintiffs adhered to the stat-
utory provisions but also show that defendant did not 
receive the copy of the summons and complaint which 
plaintiffs' mailed to him. Whether or not a defendant 
is entitled to actual notice under this statute is important 
to this inquiry. 
Nonresident motorist acts generally provide that 
i,;pecified notice of the substituted service, or a copy of 
the summons and complaint be sent to the defendant by 
mail. Many statutes require that the notice be sent to 
defendant by registered mail with return receipt re-
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quested. Some courts have construed such provision to 
mean that defendant must have actual notice of the 
pendency of the action before jurisdiction over him is 
acquired. Alexander vs. Bush, 199 Ark. 562, 134 S\V 2d 
519, Muncie vs. Westcraft Corporation, 58 \Vash. 2d 36, 
360 P. 2d 744. However, other courts have held that 
there is no absolute requirement to good and valid service 
that the defendant actually receive notice . 
.Most such statutes usually provide, as does the Utah 
Non-Resident :Motorist Statute, that notice of the sub-
situted service of process be mailed to the defendant's 
last konwn address. This does not mean necessarily 
the last address known to plaintiff, but the last known 
address of defendant which is reasonably certain to 
ascertain. 8 Am. Jur. 2d, Automobiles and Highway 
Traffic, Section 870, and the cases these cited. 
Statutory provisions relating to the mailing of notice 
to defendant's last known address are calculated to give 
defendant adequate notice of the pendancy of the action 
or proceeding and to make it reasonably certain that 
notice will reach defendant. 61 C.J.S. Motor Vehicles, 
Section 502. 
Alexander vs. Bush, supra, held that the statute 
providing for constructive notice on nonresident motor-
ists by service of process on the Secretary of State 
required "actual value" of the pendency of an action to 
bes given to the defendant before jurisdiction over him 
was acquired. See Annotation 138 ALR 1476. 
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Although there is no Utah case covering the exact 
point in question here, our Supreme Court has com-
mented on the provision of of the Utah nonresident 
.Jfotorist Statute. In construing the substituted service 
statute in question, Mr. Justice Henriod's separate con-
('urring opinion in Teague vs. District Court of the Third 
Judicial District In and For Salt Lake County, 4 U. 2d 
147, 289 P. 2d 331 (1955), state: 
It is my opinion that the statute for substi-
tuted service involved in this case, very carefully 
should be administered, since, admittidly assigned 
to protect our own residents against transient 
hit-run non-residents, it would be used as an in-
strument for oppression if one having a poor or 
unmeritorious case could refrain from serving 
process personally, having ample opportunity so 
to do, and then wait until he reasonably is sUie 
defendant is far and away, and unable to return 
to def end himself, before substituted service is 
accomplished. 
Appellant agrees with the principles stated by Jus-
tice Henriod. In doing so appellant does not take the 
position that the conduct of plaintiff was the result of 
design in waiting three years before filing the suit 
aganst plaintiff and then sending notice thereof to a 
three year old address of defendant without making 
any effort to ascertain defendant's present address and 
in waiting two months before advising defendant by 
mail of the filing of the suit and the resulting default 
judgment against him. But even though plaintiffs may 
not have accomplished what they did by design the result 
of their action was to make an instrument of oppression 
of the nonresident l\Iotorist Statute against defendant. 
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COXCLUSION 
Appellant urges upon the 'Court that the Trial Court 
erred in failing to spt aside plaintiffs' default judgment 
and allowing defendant to answ<:>r the Complaint and 
have his "dav in Court" and to have the matter fairlv . . 
heard on its merits. 
Respectfully submitted, 
KIPP AND CHARLIER 
TEL CHARLIER 
520 Boston Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Defendant and 
Appellant 
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